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The  Austrian  health  system  is  much  more  complex  and  fragmented  than  in  other OECD
countries.  In 2013  legislation  was  adopted  to  enhance  efﬁciency  through  better  balancing
care  provision  across  providers  by promoting  new  primary  care  models  and  better  coordi-
nation  of care.  Reform  objectives  should  be achieved  by  cooperative  and  uniﬁed  decision
making  across  key  stakeholders  and by adherence  to a budget  cap  that  prescribes  ﬁscal
containment  on  the  order  of  3.4 billion  Euros  until  2016.  This  is  priced  into  the  envisaged
savings  of  the  current  consolidation  program.  Efforts  have  been  made  to bridge  the  account-
ability  divide  by  establishing  agreements  and  administrative  layers  to  govern  the  health
system  by objectives.  Yet,  more  could  have  been  achieved.  For  example,  cross-stakeholder
pooling  of  funds  for better  contracting  governance  and  effective  purchasing  across  care
settings could  have  been  introduced.  This  would  have  required  addressing  overcapacity
and  fragmentation  within  social  security.  At  the  same  time,  legal  provisions  for coopera-
tive  governance  between  Sickness  Funds  and  the governments  on  the regional  level  should
have been  stipulated.  The  Austrian  2013  reform  is  interesting  to other  countries  as  it aims
to ensure  better-balanced  care  at a sustainable  path  by employing  a public  management
approach  to governance  relations  across  key payers  of  care.
© 2014  The  Author.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under
Y-NC-Nthe  CC  B
1. Introduction and objectives
Austria dedicates substantial public and total resources
to health. At 11.1%, the share of total health spending in GDP
is among the highest in OECD countries, mainly due to high
public spending (8.4%, ﬁgures for 2012). Health accounts for
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about 15% of total general government spending. The sys-
tem performs fairly well on standard output indicators. For
example, life expectancy improved over the past 30 years,
exceeding 80 years in 2008.
However, there is growing evidence that the large
resources engaged in the health system are not being efﬁ-
ciently used [11]. The Austrian health system is much more
complex and fragmented than in other OECD countries [7].
Constitutionally, the federal government is in charge of all
areas of the health care system but delegates an important
part of its responsibilities to the 9 federal states (“Länder”),
and another part to the social insurance funds (Sickness
Funds) (Fig. 1):- The Länder are in charge of developing and maintaining
an adequate hospital infrastructure, without funding it
cess article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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from their own tax revenues as Länder are not entitled
to collect taxes. Transfers from the federal government
agreed under ﬁve-yearly “constitutional agreements”
therefore fulﬁll this purpose, under relatively ﬂexible
rules open to political bargaining. Consequently, the fed-
eral government has very little direct inﬂuence on the
utilization of the funds.
 The 19 Sickness Funds are in turn delegated the task of
contracting for ambulatory care, pharmaceutical prod-
ucts and medical devices, that they fund from the
employer and employee contributions that they collect.
Sickness Funds also participate in the funding of hospi-
tals by transferring a ﬁxed share of their resources (about
35%) to Länder’ hospital funds.
This highly segmented funding structure hence weak-
ns incentives for optimization due to the inherent
ecision-making and accountability divide and puts
roviders into a very powerful position. The provision of
npatient services is mainly assured by Länder-owned hos-
itals, and outpatient services outside hospitals mainly
y independent physicians permanently contracted by
ickness Funds through their “regional physician cham-
ers”.
Federal efforts to improve the performance of the health
are system have always met  with administrative barriers
ecause decentralization of service provision and spending
as not appropriately supported by strategic regulation.
or example, in 2007 the government laid out an agenda for
ecuring ﬁnancial sustainability of Sickness Funds, which
ad accumulated high levels of debt [14]. This reforman health system before 2013 reform.
proposal was dismissed due to ﬁerce opposition, largely
from doctors but also from some Sickness Funds that
resisted more central inﬂuence. However, the need to
address debt levels became even more urgent as revenues
plunged as a consequence of the recession following the
2008 ﬁnancial crisis.
A new centre-left government introduced legislation in
2010 requesting cost containment for Sickness Funds in
exchange for tax subsidies coming from the government
budget through a “Health Fund”. It also included debt for-
giveness in annual installments until 2013. The hospital
sector was left largely untouched beyond the 1997 and
2005 reforms. Yet, challenges of ﬁscal consolidation on the
level of the “Länder” have increasingly emerged, shedding
light on growing debt levels of hospitals which had not
been priced into general government debt levels. Health
reform 2013 is a renewed attempt to address ﬁscal sus-
tainability and fragmented care delivery. The objective of
this paper is to present the key content of the 2013 health
reform and critically appraise it is potential to foster better-
balanced and coordinated care. The 2013 Austrian reform
effort is relevant for other countries because (1) it reﬂects a
new public management approach in addressing ﬁscal sta-
bility through strengthening health system governance in
a federal state and (2) it aims at improving substantially
balanced care delivery and co-ordination of care.2. The context for the health reform 2013
In spite of continuous efforts in the last 15 years to
address key weaknesses, the Austrian health care sector
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has been plagued by overcapacity in inpatient care, excess
growth of health spending and growing debt levels [1]. In
December 2010 the Ministry of Health set up a process
to develop a roadmap for health reform in 2013 involv-
ing main stakeholders, including the Ministry of Finance.
The program for reform was (1) to improve governance by
further formalizing cooperation between key stakeholders,
(2) to better balance service provision through deﬁned and
agreed objectives, and (3) to support key actors to adhere
to objectives through the introduction of a global budget
cap.
Any major reorganization of the Austrian health care
system is a constitutional issue affecting the distribution of
competencies between the federal and the regional level in
addition to Sickness Funds, which are, delegated important
tasks (Fig. 1). The current Centre-left government initially
came up with the proposal to re-arrange legal compe-
tencies for hospitals in order to create explicit political
accountability on the federal level and to foster efﬁcient
planning and coordination. However, the central govern-
ment, as has been the case with previous governments,
was unable to establish sufﬁcient parliamentary support to
enact the legislation. Thus the central government sought
to enhance cooperation between federal states and also
with the statutory health insurance.
Reﬂecting the continuously criticized accountability
divide in the Austrian health care sector [2–4], service
delivery is unbalanced across care sectors. For example,
resource use in inpatient care is high compared to other
EU 15 and OECD countries utilizing about 35 percent
of current expenditure on inpatient health care. On the
contrary, ambulatory care including outpatient care in
hospitals accounts for 25 percent of total health expen-
diture, which is signiﬁcantly lower in relative terms than
in other countries. International evidence shows that hos-
pital admissions for many important conditions could be
avoided [5–7]. Further and in contrast to other countries,
spending growth on inpatient care exceeds the growth rate
of current healthcare expenditure ([1], Fig. 26). Thus far,
planning has had little inﬂuence on the balance of activ-
ities in the healthcare sectors [13]. Even though reform
initiatives between 2005 and 2011 aimed at strengthen-
ing capacity building in ambulatory care (“reform pools”,
“Ärzte GmbHs”) they were piecemeal [12].
As other countries, Austria went through a recession in
2009 with a drop in output in the order of 3.8 percent. The
general government headline budget deﬁcit was  2.5% of
GDP in 2012, slightly up from 2011 but below the target of
the 2012 Stability Programme of 3% of GDP [15]. Public debt
increased slightly from 72.4% of GDP in 2011 to 73.5% of
GDP in 2012 and public spending edged up from 50% to 51%
of GDP. To put debt on a declining path after 2013 and to
reach a balanced budget by 2016, the government adopted
a second consolidation programme in early 2012. Includ-
ing expected revenues from tax increases (about 40%) the
government deﬁned a consolidation package for the period
2012–2016 in the order of 26 billion Euros to meet ﬁscal
targets as deﬁned by EU budget criteria. In this context and
in light of the introduction of performance based budget-
ing in 2013, health reform 2013 introduced a global budget
cap for public spending on health aimed at supportinglicy 118 (2014) 8–13
consolidation. The budget cap is derived by gradually con-
taining public health expenditure growth, i.e. to bring
down annual growth rate from an average level of about
5% (1990–2010) to projected annual average annual GDP
growth until 2016 (current forecast: 3.6% p.a.). It is
expected that with this measure the health sector will con-
tain spending growth on the order of about 3.4 billion Euros
until 2016 (Fig. 2). Of this amount and on average over the
coming years federal states will need to contribute 60 per-
cent, and statutory health insurance 40 percent. With this
level of ﬁscal containment the health sector contributes an
estimated 13 percent to the total consolidation amount of
26 billion Euros.
3. Key approaches in the health reform 2013
Major elements of the 2013 health reform are: (1) the
creation of institutional capacity for the effective real-
ization of the “governance by objectives” approach, (2)
enhanced primary care capacity, (3) standardization of care
processes, (4) monitoring of health indicators and (5) the
deﬁnition of accounting standards to better enable adher-
ence to the budget cap.
3.1. Institutional capacity for “governance by objectives”
In June 2013, the newly established “federal
commission on health system governance” (“Bun-
deszielsteuerungskommission”) approved the ﬁrst
impact-oriented federal contract on health and ﬁnancial
targets for the period 2013–2016 (“Bundesziels-
teuerungsvertrag”) [9,10]. This federal contract sets
the standards for the subsequent regional contracts, which
were approved by the “regional commissions on health
system governance” (“Landeszielsteuerungskommis-
sion”). Overall, the federal contract deﬁnes 12 strategic
goals assigned to 4 key areas of health system governance
(Fig. 3). These key areas are (1) the structure of provision,
(2) the process of care, (3) health targets and (4) ﬁnancial
targets. The core of the federal contract is a detailed
catalogue of speciﬁed 26 operative objectives and deﬁned
actions to be taken in order to achieve strategic objectives.
Every objective within the catalogue is speciﬁed, including
the deﬁnition of actions to be taken as well as measures and
target values in order to facilitate the effective evaluation
of overall attainment of the set objectives.
Although initial reform positions of participating stake-
holders (federal government, statutory health insurance,
federal states) differed substantially with regard to changes
of governance responsibilities when negotiations for the
Health Reform 2013 started (see also Ref. [1]), con-
sent could be established in key areas. For example, all
stakeholders have requested ﬁnancial planning that is
manageable in the medium term, and both federal states
and statutory health insurance wanted to transform care
provision towards more integrated care models. These
agreements formed the basis for deﬁning the new pub-
lic management approach by developing impact-oriented
contracts while leaving the institutional make-up of the
system untouched.
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Fig. 2. Budget cap on public expenditure on health and contribution to cost containment according to main ﬁnancing agents (excluding public expenditure
on  long-term care), in million EURO (nominal).
Source: Ministry of Health (BMG) [8].
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Fig. 3. Health Reform 2013 aims at building institutional capacity to moderate the accountability divide.
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3.2. Health reform 2013 aims at building more primary
care capacity
Representing key stakeholders of the newly established
commissions on health system governance, federal gov-
ernment, statutory health insurance and the federal states
agreed to implement (1) enhanced primary care models
with at least 1 percent of the population being served by
such models, (2) the establishment of at least 2 multidisci-
plinary ambulatory outpatient care centers and (3) speciﬁc
targets to increase the share of day cases for speciﬁed inter-
ventions, e.g. cataract surgery or hernia surgery, by 2016.
Moreover, the federal contract sets targets for regional
ambulatory care providers regarding opening hours in the
evening and on weekends as well as targets for reducing
hospital admissions and average length of stay, both of
which should lead to a reduction of hospital beds. While
previous initiatives to improve primary care capacity (e.g.
the 2005 “reform pool” and group practice legislation of
2010) had similar objectives, corresponding federal regu-
lation to achieve the objectives was missing or too weak
[12]. The federal contract and subsequent regional con-
tracts may  succeed in closing this gap by setting clear
standards of cooperation between statutory health insur-
ance and federal states [9,10].
3.3. Roll-out of discharge management and
standardization of diagnostics through e-health
The federal contract schedules (1) the implementation
of standardized hospital admission and discharge manage-
ment, (2) the deﬁnition and launch of disease management
programs and other forms of better coordinated care for
common and/or chronic diseases and (3) the establishment
of a commission promoting the rational use of pharmaceu-
tical products encompassing both in- and outpatient care,
as well as (4) the establishment of a telephone-based health
advice and information service by the end of 2015. While
the government has made progress in implementing elec-
tronic health records in Austria (ELGA) in recent years, the
roll-out is still difﬁcult mostly due to the resistance of the
chamber of physicians promoting the opt-out of patients.
Moreover, participation of physicians as well as patients in
the disease management programme on diabetes still falls
short of expectations [1]. Thus the renewed commitment
to better chronic care management is a timely measure to
improve health outcomes regarding both improved quality
of life and premature mortality.
3.4. Health indicators should help monitor outcomes
The federal contract deﬁnes (1) the regular measure-
ment of health indicators on a regional level, (2) the
comprehensive adoption of health technology assessments
not only for the provision of speciﬁc health services but
also for health promotion and prevention programs and
(3) instructs the development of outpatient quality indi-
cators by the end of 2014. The contract also stipulates the
enhancement of health literacy of the population. Monitor-
ing of health outcomes has become an important area on
the policy agenda as Austria has committed to improvinglicy 118 (2014) 8–13
population health by providing for a gain in two healthy life
years by 2020 following the EU 2020 strategy [1]. Austria
needs to catch-up in this area as results from a recent study
suggest [6,7].
3.5. The budget cap should leverage the achievement of
the objectives of the health reform 2013
Financial targets represent another key area of the
health governance system. In contrast to the ﬁrst three
areas, however, the identiﬁed strategic goals have not been
translated into operative objectives and subsequent actions
and measures. While the budget cap is the deﬁning enve-
lope for helping to achieve reform objectives and is in
addition part of an overall government consolidation pro-
gramme, it is intended to support action in all of the deﬁned
key areas of the reform. Thus, the budget cap is not a
means to an end but rather the overall rationale for “gov-
ernance by objectives”. Consequently, the federal contract
provides for standards on how to calculate the budget cap
in detail and sets further standards to compensate agreed
shifts of deﬁned services between sectors [10]. In order to
safeguard the implementation of targets and overall objec-
tives, the federal contract also includes detailed regulation
for monitoring and reporting, distinguishing between (1)
monitoring of the actual health expenditure as compared
to the deﬁned budget caps, (2) monitoring of the attain-
ment of the ﬁnancial goal based on bi-annual forecasts and
(3) monitoring of the actions and measures as put forward
by the operative objectives in the deﬁned key areas.
4. Critical appraisal
The 2013 Health Reform deﬁnes a set of goals to improve
health care delivery. In order to successfully fulﬁll its objec-
tives, health reform embedded a global budget cap for
public health care expenditure growth until 2016. We  iden-
tify a number of advantages of the current reform:
First, it addresses the importance of ﬁscal stability in
response to repeated claims to produce health sector spe-
ciﬁc forecasts of expenditure [7] and to global challenges
resulting from crisis-driven consolidation efforts. For the
ﬁrst time the current framework contains details about
data needs and mandates data collection to deﬁne a ﬁs-
cal envelope of public expenditure of health. This will
allow close monitoring of the performance of the health
care system in a more comprehensive way by centralizing
reporting and the deﬁnition of data standards for reporting.
Second, the reform links sanctions of non-compliance
to global ﬁscal rules (e.g. national stability pact). In order
to monitor compliance to regional health plans federal
states are required to adhere to the ﬁscal stability pact. An
updated pact came into operation in 2012 applying a set of
new and old ﬁscal rules to reach ﬁscal targets as imposed by
the EU. Compliance with these targets will be closely mon-
itored in the context of the European Semester and since
ﬁscal containment through the health sector budget cap is
priced into the consolidation path adherence will also be
closely monitored in this area.
Finally, the reform aims to right-size supply to ensure
safe care in adequate settings. While this has been an
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mportant objective in previous initiatives as well the
urrent framework stipulates details and measurable indi-
ators to monitor progress in this area. Importantly, the
ntroduced budget ceiling is expected to leverage the
mplementation of the Austrian Structural Plan (ÖSG),
hich will deﬁne the regional plans.
While these positives point to the potential of the
eform, challenges regarding implementation and effec-
iveness of measures remain.
First, instruments for better governance overlap and
iverge at the same time. With the set-up of a new multi-
takeholder commission another administrative layer to
govern by objectives” is introduced in addition to the
urrent structure. Thus, it is unclear how and if these instru-
ents will work together. Further, adherence to ﬁscal rules
t the level of federal states has often been limited in
he area of hospital operation in particular as sanctions in
rior ﬁscal pacts were never applied even though federal
tates violated or often exceeded infrastructure targets, e.g.
eduction of the number of hospital beds.
Second, the framework does not provide for an overall
hared vision with regard to innovative ambulatory care
elivery models, in particular to payment schemes. The
ariety of different payment systems within individual sec-
ors clearly contributes to imbalances in provision. As a
esult, the development of the outpatient sector is lagging
ehind and coordination of care is often poor. This applies
ot only to the crossover of inpatient and ambulatory care
ut also to coordination between different levels of ambu-
atory care, between acute inpatient care and long-term
are, and between physicians and other healthcare profes-
ionals.
Finally, the key dilemma in health and social policy
emains, namely which stakeholder is the “best compli-
entary agent” for patients. Institutions and measures
f this reform reﬂect the inability of government(s) to
hange the constitution to allow for more rational task
haring. While most other countries are also plagued with
dministrative fragmentation, the particularity of the Aus-
rian health care system nevertheless would have allowed
oving reform even within a “second best status quo”
urther. For example, this could have involved targeted
ross-stakeholder cooperation by mandating pooling of
unds and disbursing these monies according to key perfor-
ance indicators. In parallel, it would have been necessary
o harmonize the landscape of social health insurance
hat is characterized by fragmented beneﬁt packages and
ayment schemes and importantly by overcapacity.
. Conclusion
This paper aimed at giving an overview of key
pproaches of the Austrian health reform 2013. In spite of
ontinuous efforts in the last 15 years to address weak-
esses, the Austrian health care sector has been plagued
y overcapacity in inpatient care, excess growth of health
pending and debt levels. The reform agenda is largely
ath-dependent but for the ﬁrst time a global budget cap
or public spending on health is deﬁned. While expected
umulated savings in the order of 3.6 billion Euros are
[licy 118 (2014) 8–13 13
priced into the government consolidation program until
2016 the health policy approach of a budget cap is to aid the
achievement of reform objectives. These objectives focus
on better-balanced care delivery through utilizing new
public management tools (governance by objectives) and
improved central government monitoring of implementa-
tion through uniﬁed reporting standards. Reform measures
are embedded in traditional stakeholder relations, which
may  obstruct expected impacts. Even under the current
institutional make-up of these stakeholder relations health
reform in Austria could have gone further by enhanced
cross-stakeholder pooling of funds and improved purchas-
ing. To achieve further progress it will be necessary to have
a committed government, which is capable of showcasing
administrative reform by addressing fragmentation in the
architecture of the state and on the level of social health
insurance through targeting overcapacity and promoting
efﬁciency.
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